

GROUP 3 - NUCLEAR SAFETY BASIS**Subgroup A Technical Safety Requirement Violations****# SC Criterion**

- (1) *1 Any violation of a Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility's Technical Safety Requirement (or Operational Safety Requirement) Safety Limit.

[Note: Safety Limits are high-level Technical Safety Requirement controls, used infrequently across the DOE Complex. A Safety Limit is a limit on process variables associated with those safety class physical barriers, generally passive, that are necessary for the intended facility function and that are required to guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials. (Reference - 10 CFR 830.3)].

- (2) 2 Any violation or noncompliance of a Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility's Technical Safety Requirement (or Operational Safety Requirement) Limiting Control Setting, Limiting Condition for Operation, Administrative Control, or Surveillance Requirement.

Exception: An event consisting solely of a surveillance test performed after the prescribed surveillance period, and in which the equipment was found to be capable of performing its specified safety function. (See separate criterion for late surveillance tests below.)

- (3) 3 Any violation or noncompliance of a hazard control specified in a Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility's DOE approved Documented Safety Analysis [issued pursuant to 10 CFR 830.204 and including Basis for Interim Operation (BIO), etc.], or DOE issued Safety Evaluation Report that are not addressed by Criteria 3A(1) and 3A(2).

Exceptions:

- (a) An event consisting solely of a violation of a safety management program (e.g., quality assurance, personnel training) cited in the Documented Safety Analysis.
- (b) An event consisting solely of a surveillance test performed after the prescribed surveillance period, and in which the equipment was found to be capable of performing its specified safety function. (See separate criterion for late surveillance tests below.)
- (4) 4 An event consisting solely of a surveillance test performed after the prescribed surveillance period, and in which the equipment was found to be capable of performing its specified safety function.

Subgroup B Documented Safety Analysis Inadequacies

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| (1) | 2 | Determination of a positive Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) that reveals a currently existing inadequacy in the documented safety analysis [e.g., Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or Basis for Interim Operation (BIO)]. |
| (2) | 3 | Declaration of a potential inadequacy of the documented safety analysis (a potential positive USQ). [Per 10 CFR 830.203(g)] |

Subgroup C Nuclear Criticality Safety

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|-----------------|------------------|--|
| (1) | *1 | A loss of multiple nuclear criticality process-condition controls, where processes include operation, transport, and storage of fissionable materials, such that no valid controls are available to prevent a criticality accident. |
| (2) | 2 | A loss of one or more nuclear criticality process-condition controls such that an accidental criticality is possible from the loss of an additional process-condition control, where processes include operation, transport, and storage of fissionable materials. |

